To clear up some misinformation
about the first Turbo ‘Bou (N400NC)
crash at Gimli, Canada, I had the sad
experience of being there at the time
and would have been in the right seat
on that flight if the owner had not
bumped me from it just prior. I did
the video of the takeoff.
The flight was being conducted to
obtain a ferry permit. Still in the
development phase, the aircraft was
soon to be flown to Cape May, NJ,
where the program would continue
toward a Transport Canada STC
approval.
Development flights often find
systems that need to be improved. It
had not been rushed into test flight
by a “Bone Head” owner. This guy
was very well thought of by his
associates as well as we employees.
He and Goby certainly treated us
more like good friends than
owner/employee.
The pilot was a very experienced, ex
USAF type with lots of time in the
Caribou. Twenty plus development
flight hours had been flown as a
turbo on this aircraft and I was on
board the day before, when a number
of high speed runs were conducted.
The Canadian Accident Investigation
report indicated their belief that the
controls were most likely not
unlocked prior to the take off, and a
full freedom of movement was not
conducted prior to the takeoff roll. It
is very unlikely that the pilot would
have pulled the control lock handle
into the locked position during the
take off. It took about 10 seconds
from the time he was in an extreme
pitch up attitude until impact and
that's not much time for a pilot to
determine what was wrong and
correct it. Most pilots ignore check
lists now and then and some of us
have gotten away with it. No one will
ever know the exact events and
everyone can speculate
To je z jednoho PDFka.
http://www.otter-caribou.org/logbook.pdf
A z airliners.net:
This accident ironically occurred in Manitoba, at Gimli – the site of the Air Canada 767 fuel-exhaustion incident.
The aircraft involved was an experimental, modified version of the Caribou which had undergone conversion to turbine power, and was being tested to check fuel and hydraulic systems on the date of the crash, 27 August 1992.
Although the aircraft apparently rotates and climbs normally, photographic evidence indicates that control-surface movement was minimal, suggesting that the gust-locks were engaged.
While there was elevator movement upon rotation, the elevators returned to the neutral position and remained there. This is in line with the operation of the gust-lock – if the control surfaces are not in the neutral position when the lock is engaged, movement of the surfaces through neutral will engage it.
In addition to preventing control-surface movement, the gust-lock lever is supposed to inhibit the power levers to prevent the pilot from applying take-off power. It was found that the aircraft’s take-off distance was 20% longer than expected.
Wreckage analysis determined that the rudder lock was fully engaged and the aileron lock had only been disengaged at the moment of impact, supporting the conclusion that the gust-lock system had not been fully disengaged ahead of the flight, and that at least some of the locks had engaged after take-off.
Moral of the story: Check you have complete, free movement of all your control surfaces before you go anywhere.
Takze to s tou nezajistenou sedackou asi nebude pravda. |
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